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## ART, RELIGION, AND THE EMOTIONS.

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### I.

THE Good, the True, and the Beautiful are generally considered to be the proper aims of education and culture. But man must have some conception of what these qualities mean, if he would attain to the position for which he is destined by nature and by his native faculties. If he would live in human society, he must know and practice the Good. If he would adapt himself to the environment in which he lives, and desire to conquer it, he must know what is true and false; otherwise he is a mere toy in the hands of natural forces, like a savage. If, again, he would rise above the beasts of the field in his enjoyments, he must have some conception of the Beautiful. Only when man is educated along each of these lines does he develop all his faculties, since, speaking psychologically, the Good means an appeal to and development of the will; the True, of the intellect; and the Beautiful, of the feelings. Thus the whole mind of man is educated and trained. From a pedagogical point of view each one of these ideas has been considered of sufficient importance to be ministered unto by a special branch of knowledge. Ethics takes for its aim the development of the will, science that of the intellect, and æsthetics that of feeling. It would seem, therefore, as if no place and no function were left for religion in the education of man; and attempts have not been lacking to put philosophical ethics, science, and æsthetics in the place of religion.

Is this claim true or false? Has religion no longer a function in the education of man? Is it, more particularly, true, that æsthetics can replace religion in the education of the emotions? Have these questions, especially the last one, been definitely settled, or is there still something to be said for religion? It seems to me that there is; and this essay is an attempt to indicate along what lines the function of religion cannot be replaced in education by any other agency.

## I.

Perhaps the best way to approach the problem will be to discuss the relation of art and of religion to the emotions. Both art and religion have very close relations to the emotions, and therefore to each other. Art and religion both deal with the same psychological faculty—feeling; both have the same aim—to purify and clarify feeling; and both employ similar methods—to objectify and transform feelings into emotions through the medium of the intellect.

Feeling is the elementary and fundamental psychological faculty. The proof for this statement cannot be given here, since it would necessitate a long, and perhaps fruitless, discussion with the intellectualists and voluntarists in psychology. It will be best, consequently, to proceed with the argument directly, and let the essay speak for itself. Feeling is, then, the elementary psychological faculty, and as such is largely subjective. But just because feeling is primarily subjective, it is so powerful. When a man has a strong feeling, it seems as if a power from the outside had taken hold of him, since he is so little master of himself. Bodily pains, for instance, often have such an influence over us that we do things which ordinarily we would never permit ourselves to do. Pleasures often have the same effect. This is the reason why the Greeks and other nations of antiquity attributed strong feelings to demons. Man is not free, not master of himself, when under the influence of a strong feeling. It seemed, therefore, to the ancients as if a foreign power was controlling him, and in some sense the demon was considered to be a divine power. From this attitude there was only one step to the position that all feelings were religious. This is the only explanation for the fact that the cult and worship of Astaroth among the Phoenicians, and Aphrodite and Venus among the classical nations, was regarded as one of the highest religious functions. It is also the explanation for the fact that the sexual feelings have been considered as the root of religion. But while religion is feeling in its innermost nature, it does not follow that every feeling is religious. The contrary is nearer the truth, as we shall see later.

Art likewise appeals to, and is an offspring of, feeling. An artist who is coldly intellectual and has no warmth of feeling cannot even be imagined. In order to create, an artist must have an experience of

some kind which has stirred him to the depth of his heart. Goethe is a conspicuous example in this respect, since he attributes all of his poetical works to real experiences. A man who looks at art merely with the eye of the intellect may become a fine critic, but never an artist. And what is true of the artist is also true of him who enjoys art. If a poem, a picture, or a statue does not produce pleasure, it is a failure as a work of art. It may be a sermon, it may teach a moral precept, but it is not a work of art.

Art and religion deal, then, with the same psychological faculty—feeling.

But they also have a common aim—to purify and clarify feeling. The essential characteristic of man as a spiritual being is his *freedom*. That he should be master of himself at all times and under any circumstances, that he should be *compos sui* over all the strong and various currents of his mental life, distinguishes him from the animals, since the latter are always at the mercy of their impulses and instincts. Man is, however, not free when under the sway of a strong feeling. He acts blindly, impulsively, and irrationally. And a human being that acts permanently in this way cannot be considered as a fully developed personality. Children, idiots, and savages, who are driven to act by their feelings, are just on that account not held responsible for their deeds. Feeling has the power to induce to prompt action. It has a dark, mysterious background. Its origin is often hidden from us; and we can seldom give an account to ourselves, in sober moments of reflection, just why we acted in such an impulsive manner while under the sway of an emotion. The reason is, perhaps, because feelings are so closely associated with our bodily condition. We touch here upon that mysterious borderland of mind and matter which is so fascinating just because of the futility of our efforts to penetrate it. If the much-debated question of subconsciousness were settled in the affirmative, we might say that the feelings arose from there. Indeed, the way some of our instinctive feelings of aversion and attraction arise seems to give substantial support to the theory of subconsciousness. Some of these feelings are so strong and powerful, and seem withal so unreasonable in the light of clear reflection, that their origin clearly points toward a background of our conscious life as a source and feeder of the latter. They do certainly

not arise through a clearly discernible intellectual process. We are not able to analyze them in any way; they come and go whither they list. All that we can do is to watch their development and decline. But these are merely the borders of feelings. Their essence eludes definition and analysis. As Professor James Ward says: "Feeling as such is, so to put it, matter of *being* rather than of direct knowledge."<sup>1</sup>

Whether feelings arise, then, from subconsciousness or from the complexity of intellectual and volitional processes, it is certain that they have a most important bearing on our mental and physical well-being, and prompt us to actions which are not always conducive to our welfare. They make us captives and hold us under their spell. Man is, then, not free when impelled to action merely by his feelings.

In order to be free, we must be liberated from the thrall of our own feelings, for man is free only when the intellect guides and the will rules. Art and religion have the aim to accomplish this task. They accomplish this result by making feelings objective. The psychical energy which constitutes feeling must be diverted into some other channel. But there are only two ways of doing this. A feeling may be objectified either through the intellect or through the will. We may turn the psychical energy of a feeling, or at least part of it, either into reflection or into a deliberate action. One of these two things must be done, otherwise feeling—*e. g.*, anger—will feed upon itself or impel us to a blind action, and thus work great mischief. But, by being diverted, a new channel is opened up for the psychical energy which would otherwise be used up in feeling, and an immediate relief is the result. Unless such relief is procured, the "pent-up emotions"—just because they are purely subjective—will work mischief. Let us use an illustration. When a man is in a bad humor, a gloomy mood, he is not only conscious of his humor and mood, but he feels heavy; his whole mind seems to be working under difficulties; it is as if an iron hoop were placed around his mind and were drawn constantly tighter. We feel repressed, strained, confined, shackled, hampered, or—to use an expressive German word—*unfrei*. The whole mind is under a painful and disagreeable tension, and the

<sup>1</sup>*Encyclopædia Britannica*, article "Psychology," Vol. XX, p. 71.

chief characteristic of this tension is that of lack of freedom within the mind. It is impossible to define the feeling in such a mood, and hardly possible to describe it; but any person who has experienced it will perhaps recognize it from this description. Now let someone make a joke. We laugh, and the atmosphere clears up immediately. The tension disappears; we feel light, happy, and free. The feeling of buoyancy takes the place of heaviness; hopefulness, that of depression; freedom, that of confinement. Our whole mental attitude changes in an instant, and if we reflect on the matter, we wonder how a small thing like that joke could work such a miracle. The simple fact is that our feeling has been liberated, by being objectified. We are no longer under its thrall, because our psychical energy, which was under the domination of a feeling, has been turned into a different channel. It is no longer purely subjective, it has become partly objective. It feeds no longer upon itself, since it includes an object. The strangeness and suddenness of such a change in our mental attitude can be compared to the changes which are sometimes wrought in the physical atmosphere. When a heavy fog holds a landscape captive, everything appears dull and monotonous: no tints of shades and lights, no clearness in the outlines of objects, no characteristic distinctions in the shapes of hills and mountains; everything is a dull, monotonous gray. Now let the sun shine upon this landscape. Immediately every object receives its own outlines, appears in its own tints and colors, and is clearly marked off in its own individuality from other objects. The landscape which was held captive in the fog has been set free by the sun.

We need not look, however, only to a joke to work changes of this kind in our mental attitude. Any agency which diverts psychical energy from feeling will accomplish a similar result. Sometimes it is a happy suggestion or intuition which throws light on a difficulty. Nor need the feeling be as intense as a temporary gloomy mood to require objectification for the purpose of liberation. A feeling of this kind may continue for years; joys and sorrows may come and go, and still there may be an undercurrent in our consciousness which gives a sinister coloring to our whole mental life. We may never be able to read and interpret the coloring, since it seems to mingle with all our moods and to give a certain tint to our consciousness.

Then suddenly the gloom may be lifted by a happy suggestion. Perhaps the best illustration of what I mean is the incident reported by Virgil.<sup>2</sup> Æneas and his party had been wandering around different seas and countries, meeting all kinds of fates, but being more or less gloomy for not knowing where they were ultimately to settle. Several attempts had been unsuccessful. When they reached the shores of Latium, they were so ahungered that they ate up even the flat cakes which served as tables. Whereupon Virgil continues:

“What! Eating up your boards beside?”  
In merry vein Iulus cried.  
That word at once dissolved the spell:  
The father caught it as it fell,  
With warning look all utterance stilled,  
And marveled at the sign fulfilled.

Anchises had said:

“Whene’er on unknown shores you eat  
Your very boards for lack of meat,  
Then count your home already found:  
There build your town and bank it round.”<sup>3</sup>

Sometimes an undercurrent of sadness takes hold of the consciousness of a whole people or age. This was the case with the ancient Greeks, and they never were able to shake it off entirely because of their belief in *moira*. They were cheerful and light-hearted on the whole; they enjoyed nature and sensuous pleasures as perhaps no other nation has ever done. But all through their literature we find a note of sadness—indefinite and fleeting, but omnipresent and depressing. Even in its loftiest flights, as in Homer and Sophocles, this strain of sadness is never absent. We miss the note of hopefulness and buoyancy in their literature. This undercurrent of sadness was due to two causes—the absence of a definite conviction concerning immortality, and the conception of an iron and implacable fate ruling everything and dominating even the gods. Whatever dim hopes they had concerning immortality was not of a cheering quality, since Achilles tells Odysseus that he would rather be keeper of swine in the upper world than king in the under world. The liberating word was spoken in this respect by Christianity, with its definite promise of immortality and its conception of God as a

<sup>2</sup>*Æneid*, Book VII, ll. 107-47.

<sup>3</sup>JOHN CONINGTON’s translation, pp. 236, 237.

loving Father. And not to the Greeks only, but to all the nations of antiquity this promise and conception came as a word of liberation. Christianity objectified the longings and made definite the vague hopes of the nations for continued personal existence.

Feeling must, then, be objectified, if we are to become free.

Both art and religion aim, however, at liberating us from the thrall of mere feeling, since both have the purpose of clarifying, purifying, and elevating feeling. A religion which does not fulfil this function is of little value to man. An object of art which does not call forth in us a pure pleasure has no claim on the name artistic.

## II.

It will be necessary now to show that feelings need to be clarified in order to become religious and æsthetic. If we consider every feeling as religious, we return to the conception which mankind had concerning this matter in its childhood, the age when all feelings without any exception were referred to a deity.

We should relinquish, consequently, the result of a long struggle—the attainment of our freedom, the most precious fruit of the many and hard battles of man with himself and his environment. Moreover, if feelings *per se* are considered to be religious, we could not very well deny religion of some kind to animals, since they undoubtedly have feelings. If we are, then, to hold fast that which we have gained, and if we do not want to make an absurd assumption, we must distinguish natural feelings from the religious and æsthetic. In other words, the former must be transformed into the latter.

How is this done? The natural feelings must become emotions by being referred to an idea through the instrumentality of the intellect. This is accomplished in religion by the reference of the feeling to the idea of God. Through this reference the *ego* recognizes itself as determined by God even in its innermost nature, its feelings.

Two illustrations will make this clear. The craving for food is a purely natural feeling.

When a healthy man sits down to a well-prepared meal, he is animated by the desire to satisfy his hunger. The feeling is natural and healthy, but not religious. How is it changed from the former into the latter? By saying "grace." This means that the food is considered a gift from God, not merely for the satisfaction of physical

appetite, but for the strengthening of the body to enable us to do more work. It is this reference of the natural feeling beyond its immediate purpose—to satisfy an appetite—which redeems it from its natural character, and gives it a religious bearing.

The feeling of revenge is also natural. To strike back when you have been struck is as natural as to crave for food when you are hungry. And still, if this emotion were given free rein, society would be impossible. Revenge must, therefore, be changed into a feeling of indignation over wrong done. It must be referred to the standard of justice in society and in God. This standard requires punishment, not for the sake of retribution, but for that of the improvement of the criminal. In this way revenge becomes, through its reference to the idea of justice, an ethical or a religious feeling. The feeling of revenge is objectified and transformed.

Art has a similar purpose in regard to the feelings. The pleasure we have in looking at a beautiful object is immediate and natural, but it is not æsthetic enjoyment. The natural pleasure is turned into the latter by becoming imagination, since the latter means not only an immediate sensuous pleasure, but an interplay of the emotions with intellect and will. Uncontrolled imagination or fancy is, of course, mental activity without let or hindrance, but in artistic imagination this mental activity is guided by a principle. The creative artist desires to embody an idea in his statue and picture, and the connoisseur wants to find that idea. The emotions of both the artist and the connoisseur are thus guided by a principle; they are objectified and transformed, and become æsthetic enjoyment. An illustration will make this clearer. Suppose we look at the picture of a beautiful woman. The effect is immediate—a sensuous pleasure arising from the mellow colors and the attractiveness of features. This pleasure is almost instinctive. But if we stop there, the probability is that the beauty of the woman will arouse sensual desire. That is not æsthetic enjoyment, but purely sensual pleasure. If, however, feeling is referred to the idea which the artist wished to embody—*e. g.*, chastity, motherliness, aspiration, etc.—our feeling is transformed into artistic enjoyment, because it gives food to the imagination. The elementary feeling of sensuous pleasure has become purified and elevated into a noble and wholesome sentiment,

and we have thus been liberated from the thrall of the merely sensuous enjoyment. All art must have the faculty to arouse both this immediate pleasure and the mediate æsthetic sentiment. False art stops with the former. The necessity for this transformation lies in the fact that, like all elementary feelings, so the immediate pleasure arising from the observation of a beautiful object gets control over us, and we are not free. If we would enjoy æsthetically, the pleasure must be transformed into the purer and more elevated atmosphere of the ideal. For thus alone are we freed from the thrall of the immediately given, and are able to enjoy æsthetically; *i. e.*, as free human beings.

The purposes of art and religion are, then, the same, since both aim at liberating us from the sway of feeling.

They follow, moreover, the same method. This has already been indicated, since the elevation and purification of feelings can be accomplished only by their transformation and objectification. We have seen that man is not free when under the spell of a feeling. Is, then, the object of art and religion to kill or to suppress feeling? No; since man is dead without feeling. A man who is no longer capable of a deep and strong emotion is dead. He is *blasé*, he is cynical, he is an intellectual machine. Nothing can give him a keen and positive enjoyment; he is capable only of the negative satisfaction of spoiling other people's enjoyment. The purpose of art and religion cannot, consequently, be to kill or to suppress the emotions, but to transform and to control them. How? By directing them outward under the mediation of the intellect. Art does this by directing feeling to the sublime and beautiful in nature or in art proper; religion, by focusing feeling on the holy and perfect divine personality. This transformation of elementary feeling through art and religion must be treated separately, since it deals largely with the intellect; *i. e.*, with representation.

### III.

By "representation" we mean a mental picture, an image, a percept, or a concept. Whenever we try to get some more or less definite idea we have a representation in one of these four forms. How do we come by a representation in religion?

Religion is, to say it once more, feeling in its essence. But if it were only feeling, we should have to admit that animals had religion. The latter alternative seems absurd, and feeling must, consequently, be combined with a rational element in order to become religious. In feeling the individual becomes aware only of the obscure and mysterious background of life. It is indeterminate, aimless, and directed only to the satisfaction of immediate needs. We know, of course, by what process man attains to representations in regard to objects which appeal to our senses. But religious ideas have no such visible objects, and only a mind which is sufficiently developed can form a representation of a divinity. This very fact excludes animals from having religion, since they are not able to reason. Feelings must, then, be transformed into something else, through the medium of the intellect. They have to become representation; they must receive a definite object. Since there is, however, no definite object in religion which can serve as a basis for representation—as, for instance, in that of a tree, animal, etc.—the task of forming a religious representation falls upon imagination—*i. e.*, the creative, constructive element in our mind. Since man can, moreover, construct only in his own image, the representation of the deity must necessarily bear the features of himself. He images the deity as a being similar to himself. He gives it personality. He cannot image the divine being as inferior to himself, since he regards himself as the highest form of living beings. If he deviates from the course of picturing the deity similar to himself, the deviation will be along the line of magnifying that divine power. He will give it the attributes of omnipotence, immortality, and, with the Greeks, eternal youth.

The objection must be met here that people on the level of savages have pictured the deity in the form of animals, of fetishes, and of other things below themselves in mental power. Man had and still has little constructive power on that level of culture. He simply felt that there was a power in some way superior to himself. He found that nature with its tremendous power—manifested in thunderstorms and hurricanes, in strong beasts and wild animals—was such a being. Since he could not image this power without a definite object, he attributed it to beings which he perceived to move like animals, or to call forth vegetation like the sun, to destroy like the

earthquake, etc. The animals, the stars, the fetich, were to him simply images of this destructive or benevolent, but always superior, power of nature. And nature appeared to him blind, uncanny, violent, arbitrary, just as he himself was. Polytheism is, consequently, the stage in man's development in which he pictures the deity in his own image.

When we turn to the Greeks, we find that the same truth holds. They pictured their deities after their own image. The gods are simply on a higher plane, endowed with all the good and bad qualities of the better Greeks. This fact is too well known to need any further explanation.

A purely spiritual conception of God was introduced by Christianity—a view anticipated in part in the Hebrew conception of Jehovah. And here a parting of the ways takes place. A purely intellectual conception of God is and must be impersonal, superpersonal, or whatever we may choose to call it. Such a view is the work of reason proper; its conception of God is that of an *absolute*, of a *principle*, of a *force*, or whatever names may be given to it. This is the conception of God in science. And reason true and simple cannot have any other view concerning God, because it cannot image a personal God who is omnipresent, yet personal; immanent in the universe, and still not absorbed by nature; unconscious in inorganic beings, yet self-conscious in man; concerned with the affairs of all the worlds, and still hearing and answering the prayer of a little child. A God of this kind cannot be conceived in any way, except in a more or less anthropomorphic form; and so the purely intellectual conception of science will, as a rule, have none of it. The terms "absolute," "principle," "force," etc., serve it better.

With such a conception of the divine, religion is impossible, only a religious tendency or attitude; because religious feelings cannot be focused and become definite without a clear representation. Science declines, however, to define the ultimate ground of existence in this manner, and leaves the feelings vague and fluctuating.

If man were a purely intellectual being, religion would never have outgrown the stage of pantheism. But he is also a willing and an emotional being. The objection will immediately be raised that neither the volitions nor the emotions have anything to do in a theoretical discussion, and, if admitted at all, are only of secondary

importance. I should like to reply that religion is not a purely theoretical affair, but a tremendously practical one; and that in practical matters the emotions are of fully as great importance as the intellect. It is outside of the province of this paper to enter into a lengthy discussion with the intellectualists, and so I simply give two quotations, one from a literary man, and one from a psychologist, who, by the way, is a voluntarist. John Burroughs says:

We are bound to give the reason and the understanding full sway in their own proper fields. In subduing and in utilizing this world, or adjusting ourselves to it, we have no guide but science. Yet science is not the main part of life, notwithstanding all the noise it is making in the world. Science is making a great noise in the world because it is doing a great work. Literature, art, religion, speculation, have had their day; that is, the highest achievements of which they are capable are undoubtedly of the past. But science is young; it is now probably only in the heat of its forenoon work. It is a little curious that man's knowing faculties, the first to be appealed unto, should be the latest in maturing; that he should worship so profoundly, admire so justly, act so wisely and heroically, while he yet knew so little accurately of the world in which he was placed. Does not this fact point to the conclusion that science is not the main part of life?<sup>4</sup>

Professor Harald Höffding says:

In feeling we have the innermost state of the conscious individual as determined by the influences received from without and by the activity exercised by the individual himself.<sup>5</sup> . . . . Everything which is really to have power over us must manifest itself as emotion or passion.<sup>6</sup>

But if feeling is to rise above instinct in religion; if, in other words, it is to be a motive power in a beneficent manner, it must become clear, definite, and determined; and for this purpose a clear and definite representation is required.

Such a representation demands a personal divine being. The interests of the intellect are purely theoretical, and these may be satisfied by a *principle, absolute*, or any similar conception of the ultimate ground of existence. The interest of the emotions is always practical—especially in religion—and that can be satisfied only with a representation of God as a person. The practical demand may be satisfied with a deified man or animal. The theoretical demand, however, is opposed to a representation of this kind. The result is

<sup>4</sup>*The Light of Day*, pp. 97, 98.

<sup>5</sup>*Outlines of Psychology*, p. 272.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 284.

a compromise. The mind represents God as a person. Personality is spirit in the form of character; its attributes are self-consciousness, self-activity, and freedom.

This representation of God as a person contains, just because it is a compromise, the germs of a conflict. If the mind lays stress on the theoretical interest, then the more scientific—*i. e.*, intellectual—conception of pantheism will exercise the greatest attraction, and present the most probable solution. If the mind lays stress on the practical interests of life, the more artistic—*i. e.*, emotional—conception of theism will present the fewest difficulties. The same individual may be, consequently, a pantheist as a thinking, and a theist as an emotional, being. And frequently we find a popular conception of God—as an anthropomorphic being—run parallel with the official theology which presents God as a purely spiritual conception.

The conflict between the demands of the intellect and that of the emotions leads, then, to the compromise of a spiritual personality. Such a personality cannot be imaged; an image of God as a person is, however, necessary if the emotions are to be satisfied. The question arises: How are we to get a worthy and dignified image of God and still leave his pure spirituality intact? The ancient religions perished because they were unable to meet these two demands. With the increasingly purer conception of God, images of stone or wood—or even of marble and of paint, as among the Greeks—were no longer considered adequate representations of the deity. The problem was not only of theoretical, but also of practical interest. Philosophy attempted to solve the former by conceiving God as pure *Idea*, especially in the True, the Beautiful, and the Good. But this conception was beyond the comprehension of the multitude, who knew just enough philosophy to discard all the popular representations of the gods as unworthy, but were not able to grasp the truth in the new conception of Plato. And thus Greek religion degenerated; it had no power or influence upon the lives of men. But the demand for a worthy representation of God was unquenchable. And the yearning, groping, and hoping for a religion of this kind explains the readiness with which many people accepted Christianity. For here the problem had been solved. God was conceived as a pure spirit,

but personal. As such he was, of course, not capable of being represented. The result was another compromise. God became incarnate in Jesus Christ. This conception left the pure spirituality of the Godhead intact, and it supplied at the same time a means to represent the divine being worthily in the God-man.

We have now briefly sketched the way in which the mind represents the divine being through the agency of the imagination and satisfies a demand of the emotions. The process has been that of a gradually increasing purification of the conception of God. As men had clearer conceptions of morality, they wanted a worthy representation of God as a moral being. Their love was, however, always an image of the loved one: crude and ignoble in the lower stages, prompted only by fear and reward; refined and unselfish in Christianity, prompted by a yearning after perfection and a longing for a father's love. But all through the process the more or less crude religious emotions were purified and clarified by the medium of the representation.

#### IV.

In a similar manner are the sensuous feelings transformed into æsthetic emotions through the medium of the intellect, *i. e.*, through imagination or emotional construction. A color of a certain shade and intensity makes a pleasant impression upon us; it is a purely sensuous pleasure. How does it become artistic enjoyment? When this color is seen in relation to other colors in the same object; when I perceive this relation to be one of difference, but when the differences are just sufficiently great to produce variety in a harmonious whole. Artistic enjoyment is, therefore, an emotional construction out of purely sensuous pleasure and the intellectual elements of unity and relation. The beautiful, whether in nature or in art, must represent an idea which gives unity to the parts; the idea must appeal to our emotions through the senses, and the two combined must give rise to a new construction in our imagination. The idea alone will not give rise to artistic enjoyment, since some ideas are derived from ugly objects; the sensuous pleasure alone will not produce it, since that is almost entirely physical; the two must combine in a new construction. The sensuous pleasure must give emotional warmth to it, and the idea must give it unity, harmony, and suggestiveness.

But these two elements must be present simultaneously if we are to have æsthetic pleasure; else the enjoyment is labored, like that of a joke which has to be explained. The idea and the sensuous pleasure must be the result of a single representation. The perfect combination of these two elements in a new construction is as difficult as that of a purely spiritual personality in religion. The result is a conflict in art as old as that in religion. Is the sensuous pleasure in art the principal thing, or is it the intellectual element? Are objects of art beautiful merely because they are true portraits of pumpkins, snakes, sea-urchins, etc., even though these things are ugly? Or are only those pictures, statues, etc., artistic, which represent a beautiful object plus an idea? It is not our purpose to enter into this contest, since volumes might be written about it. We only wished to indicate that the struggle between the intellectual and the emotional element is as old and severe in art as it is in religion.

## V.

If both art and religion clarify and purify feeling by objectification, we should expect the highest possible effect where the two work in conjunction. This is, indeed, the case. The *Symposium* of Plato owes its perennial charm to the fact that the Good, the True, and the Beautiful are presented as the one permanent being over against the changeable and perishable, the bad, false, and ugly. Plato conceives the divine both as good and beautiful; he has both a religious and an artistic temperament. The superiority of the art of Angelo, Rafael, and Leonardo da Vinci is due to the presence both of religious and æsthetic elements in the temperaments of these men, which sought expression in one presentation. Sometimes the ability to objectify these religious-æsthetic emotions is inadequate, and we get then the rapture and the exultations of the mystic, which are often exceedingly effective just because they are suggestive rather than explicit. The great service which music has rendered to the cause of Christian religion is too well known to need more than mention. When a service is conducted without the assistance of the arts, as for instance in the strictly Puritan churches, the tendency is toward intellectualism—*i. e.*, toward dogmatism—and therefore toward rationalism; and the emotions, instead of being kept supple and

pliant, become hard and rigid. In other words, the elimination of the æsthetic element has the tendency to drive out the emotions from religion altogether. Where, on the other hand, the artistic element—*e. g.*, music—plays too prominent a part, religion tends to become purely emotional, volatile, and ineffective in building up a strong character. The best results are obtained when æsthetic elements are combined with those of religion, and both are purified and objectified through the medium of the intellect. The emotions are then kept supple and pliant; they prevent the mind from becoming too intellectual; and the intellect not only furnishes new material for the emotions, but clarifies and purifies them. In this way the mind is always kept on the alert; the imagination has sufficient material for new constructions; and the result is a well-balanced and happy mind.

## VI.

Art and religion have, then, a similar effect on the feelings, and they often co-operate in this respect. What place belongs to each in education? Can art take the place of religion in the development of the emotions? From what has been said so far, it would seem as if this might be the case. But art and religion differ, nevertheless, so much in their effect upon feelings that they can never serve as substitutes for each other.

Art is, in the first place, for a few select spirits, while religion is democratic and for all people. The way mankind is at present constituted will make it impossible for the majority of men to be educated in the arts to such an extent that æsthetic enjoyment can replace the religious.

We may find fault with this fact, but the fact itself cannot be doubted. The number of *Schöngeister*—as the Germans appropriately call the people who worship art—is comparatively small, and will remain so for some centuries to come, simply because æsthetic enjoyment presupposes a special training which few people are able to obtain, and because a large number of men and women are not endowed with the faculty to enjoy art.

Suppose, however, that these two conditions were met—*i. e.*, that every human being had the ability and the opportunity to be educated in the arts—would religion then become superfluous? I believe

not. Art is impersonal, while religion is intensely personal. And certain moods of man can be assuaged and satisfied only by personal relations. The man who is depressed wants someone to cheer and comfort him; a friend may do this, but more frequently—as in the case of bereavement through death—he will require the comfort of religion, because God is both more willing to comfort and more powerful to help. And, again, the strength of the hold which religion has upon the affections of men may be seen from the fact that religion deals with questions of much greater and more permanent importance than the arts. Whether idealism or realism is to be the ruling principle in art may disturb the peace of a small number of people for a considerable length of time; but whether man is mortal or immortal is a question of the greatest importance for all men all the time.

Moreover, the enjoyment of art is generally a holiday affair. It is for the few hours when we are in a pleasant and peaceful mood. The whole attitude of our minds must be free from care and worry when we come before a picture, in order to enjoy it æsthetically. How small is, for instance, the number of people who have been edified by Millet's "Angelus" in comparison with those who have been uplifted by what that picture presents, *prayer!* How far must most of us go in order to hear good music, see fine pictures, or even to get proper books! How near and always ready is, on the other hand, the comforting and uplifting influence of prayer!

These differences indicate clearly that art cannot compare with religion in its influences upon the emotions. The difference is so great that art has generally been used as an auxiliary to religion; and in this position it is much more effective than when it stands alone.

I do not mean to disparage the wholesomeness of æsthetic enjoyment. I simply mean that, measured in terms of influence upon the life of man, art can never compete with religion. Æsthetic emotions are pleasurable enjoyment. They presuppose a mind that is already contented and cheerful. The æsthetic emotions are more contemplative, more self-satisfying, than those of religion; the contemplation of the beautiful produces pure pleasure which is ennobling and uplifting, but does not prompt man to action. Just as we have to be in a happy frame of mind when we approach the beautiful, so we

enjoy it in a purely personal way, the thought of God or of our neighbor hardly ever enters our mind. How different with the religious emotions of reverence, love, sympathy! They prompt to action by their very nature; they are social in their very essence, and need expression through action directed toward other human beings.

I think even these few remarks will suffice to show that art can never serve as a substitute for religion in the education of the emotions.

Has religion an equal chance with ethics in the education of the will, and with science in that of the intellect?

Secular ethics appeals to the will through the intellect. This is the Greek conception—*i. e.*, that man fails to do the right thing because of his ignorance of it. Secular ethics can never get away from this conception. It must, of course, be admitted that many sins are committed in sheer ignorance. But most evil deeds are done in weakness and in more or less open defiance of the rules of right. And here secular ethics shows its powerlessness in the influence over the will. “A religionless morality” has, whenever it has been tried, been found wanting. Why? Because the ethical precepts cannot be “driven home” so that the individual will feel impelled to act. The objection may be raised, of course, that in an ideal condition of society this ought to be and would be the case; that insight into right would produce corresponding action. True, but we are not as yet living in an ideal community. We must take men as they are, not as we should like them to be. And as men are constituted at present they undoubtedly need all the props in their morality which we can possibly give them.

Secular ethics has no props. It appeals either to enlightened self-interest or to the categorical imperative. In the former case the connection between what is perceived to be right and the corresponding action is made through a careful balancing of advantages and disadvantages resulting from conduct as a whole. In how many cases short-sighted policy decides for the more direct course of immediate advantage through immoral action is too well known to need further discussion. In the case of the categorical imperative of Kant we have a lofty flight into realms of abstract reasoning, but the application in the practical principles sounds rather like a sublimated utilitarianism; *e. g.*, “act on a maxim which thou canst will to be a

universal law." This is simply the philosophical form of the Golden Rule, which is not the highest expression of Christian ethics. If, on the other hand, the categorical imperative is taken in its rigorous form, and we are to consider only those actions as moral which we do against our inclinations, we get into a condition where life would be such a constant strain that everybody would wear himself out in a short time; and that for no purpose, since there is not necessarily a conflict between morality and happiness. It is true, of course, that many actions must be done against inclinations, but that ought to be so only at the time of the formation of good habits. The latter once formed, there should be at least a mild pleasure in doing a good act. If the action must always be done by means of a severe struggle, the inference is clear that the actor is still immoral in his feelings, and that the law he obeys is still largely external.

Christianity supplies a higher motive than utilitarianism, and obviates at the same time the rigor of the categorical imperative. It uses both of these motives. The command, "Thou shalt not," is as categorical as need be. The promises for obedience and the Golden Rule are utilitarian. But they are looked at only as the beginning of morality, and they are employed only as substitutes and schoolmasters for the Christian motive. What is that motive? It is love. Love takes possession of man in such a manner that there is little room for reflection, and the question of utilitarianism does not even have a chance to arise. Love likewise does of its own accord what the categorical imperative demands, and makes the latter superfluous. It has its roots in feeling, and has its own motive force in itself. For when the feelings are enlisted in a cause, action follows spontaneously. Moreover, it prompts to action even in those numerous cases where action may not be pleasant. Where the categorical imperative simply asserts its immutable law and requires obedience, no matter what the cost, love by looking at the loved one immediately suppresses individual preferences for the happiness of the other party. And since its own happiness consists in seeing the loved one happy, love requires no long and circuitous reasoning to the effect that only when we do act fairly by others will they act similarly toward us. Utilitarian motives are entirely foreign to true love. Lastly, love makes man happy. But only when we are happy can

we effectively assist others. The cheerfulness in giving—whether it be material things, advice, encouragement, etc.—is as valuable as the gift itself. The pessimist cannot be effective in assisting others, just because he lacks the cheerfulness and hopefulness which make the gift valuable to anyone who is not reckoned among the degenerates.

Love between husband and wife, parents and children, friends and comrades, undoubtedly has the power to act as a motive in this threefold capacity; viz., to produce spontaneously good actions, to overcome individual preferences, and to put man into the proper frame of mind to be willing to act morally. But love of this kind acts only within comparatively small circles, and cannot serve a general ethical principle. If it is to serve as such, it must be universalized. How can that be accomplished?

Christianity shows the way. It makes love a universal principle by declaring God to be love. It declares God to be a father, and thus to have a personal interest in every man. The fatherhood of God implies the brotherhood of man. The family relation is made universal, and the love and spontaneity for ethical conduct in the family is to become the motive force for men in their relation to all other men. The medium by which the unknown hosts of humanity enter into the affections of the individual is the intellect, and this process means essentially a refinement and a broadening of the emotions. By representing these people vividly we get a more or less clear picture of them; and by picturing them as members of the same family—as children of God—we are able to transfer a share of our love for our relatives, friends, and neighbors to the distant people scattered over the globe. We love them as far as people who have no direct or personal relations with us can be loved. The emotions are thus broadened. These people are, moreover, represented as having similar relations to God, and thus the brotherhood of man becomes a real force in our conduct to strangers. That this is not idle talk is witnessed amply by the motives of Christian missionaries who are impelled to undergo hardships of all kinds by no other motive than love for their more unfortunate brothers and sisters in distant lands. The emotions are thus constantly directed from the immediate to the mediate, from the near to the far, from the present to the pictured, and undergo in this process an increasing refinement.

The ethical problem solves itself more easily on the basis of the Christian religion than on that of secular ethics, and the latter cannot become a substitute for the former.

But religion has a competitor also in the intellectual realm in science and philosophy. And this competition is much more successful than that of art and ethics in the realm of feelings and of the will, respectively. By far the greatest share of the development of the intellect falls to the lot of science and philosophy, taken in the broadest sense. This fact cannot be disputed. And still, religion contributes essential elements even to the development of the intellect; elements which are by no means secondary, superfluous, and replaceable. To begin with, some of the greatest problems of philosophy—*e. g.*, immortality, the divine being, free-will—belong as much to religion as they do to philosophy, and have, indeed, been given to the latter by the former. Other more specifically theological problems—*e. g.*, the incarnation, the nature of sin, and the sonship of man—are questions requiring the greatest intellectual acumen for their solution. On the other hand, some of the specific problems of science and of philosophy—*e. g.*, the constitution of the physical universe and the theory of knowledge, respectively—are of the deepest concern to religion. It is not necessary to enter into this matter further, since intellectual and religious problems overlap constantly, because religion is, and necessarily must be, a *philosophy* when it becomes conscious of itself, *i. e.*, wishes to give a reason for the hope which is in it.

If the reasoning of this essay has been correct, we may draw two conclusions: (1) Religion contributes important elements to the education of man in regard to his whole mental nature; *i. e.*, of the feelings, the will, and the intellect. (2) Religion contributes, moreover, essential elements to the development of the human mind, which are peculiar to itself, and which cannot be supplied by any other agency. It will, therefore, always retain a place in the educational scheme of mankind.

But a warning must be added. Religion must be of the right kind, if it is to fill and retain this place. It must be well balanced; it must maintain a happy medium between intellectualism and emotionalism. If it inclines too much toward the former, it will become

a philosophy and produce that most contemptible of all conceits, of which some confessions of faith are examples—the type of mind which has fathomed all the depth of knowledge human and divine, and is, therefore, able to sit upon its exalted throne in order to pass judgment upon all who disagree. If, on the other hand, too much stress is laid on the emotional element, religion produces that abnormal state of mind which craves enjoyment of a peculiar kind—a continuous wallowing in sentimentality—and which by feeding upon itself finally lands man in the slough of despair. If, moreover, religion overemphasizes mere moral conduct, it tends to become external, to lose its vitality and enthusiasm, and must die. In order to act as an educational force, religion must appeal to the whole man, and thus contribute its share in his development toward the Good, the True, and the Beautiful.